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Ambiguity and Gender Differences in Financial Decision Making:
An Experimental Examination of Competence and Confidence Effects




This paper reports the results of an experiment that brings together psychological measures of
competence and overconfidence with laboratory economic measures of individual valuations
of uncertainty.  We examine the valuations of risky and ambiguous lotteries in a financial
decision context. The experiment can be viewed in two parts. The first part replicates an
experimental design reported by Heath and Tversky (1991) but within a financial market
context. This part produces two measures: 1) competence, the perception of feeling
knowledgeable or competent in an area and 2) overconfidence, the well documented result
that many individuals overestimate their ability. These measures, together with an indicator of
objective knowledge, were used to explain elicited certainty equivalents in the second part of
the experiment. Certainty equivalents were elicited for lotteries that were contingent on the
price movements of real stock and bond funds, the price changes of simulated virtual funds,
and pure risk lotteries.  These represent three different levels of uncertainty: two-sided
ambiguity, one-sided ambiguity and pure risk. Our results show a significant relationship
between individual overconfidence and competence measures and elicited values of lotteries
in a financial decision context. Further, the interaction of overconfidence, competence and
knowledge measures with gender produce nearly opposite effects.
Key Words: risk, ambiguity, overconfidence, gender, financial decision making, economic
experiments
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1. Introduction
A fundamental problem in the analysis of choices under uncertainty is the distinction between
risk, where the probabilities are known, and ambiguity, where there is also uncertainty about
the probability distribution. The emphasis on ambiguity stems from its relevance for the
evaluation of real life decisions (Heath and Tversky, 1991). In financial markets a decision is
normally based on knowledge about an investment as well as historical price patterns but
lacking information about specific probabilities. Such a situation is obviously ambiguous.
Additionally, empirical evidence shows that individuals deviate systematically from the
predictions of standard economic theory that assumes the individual maximizes a stable
(expected) utility function. Heath and Tversky (1991) propose that an individual’s perception
of his or her own competence could be an explanation of these deviations.
A tributary question of gender differences in investment behavior may also be considered in
this context. There is some evidence for the existence of such differences (Jianakoplos and
Bernasek, 1996, Barsky et.al., 1997, Powell and Ansic, 1997), but also against it (Schubert
et.al., 1999). There is also strong evidence that men, on average, are more overconfident than
women (Barber and Odean, 2001).
Therefore this paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment designed to deal with the
question of ambiguity and whether measured overconfidence and competence influence an
individual’s willingness to pay for an investment under different formats of uncertainty. In
addition, research is extended to examine whether overconfidence and competence may
explain the contradictory evidence on gender differences. In order to separate effects resulting
from different attitudes from effects resulting from different constraints (such as income,
wealth, or professional carriers), we use the method of a controlled laboratory experiment.
Measures of overconfidence and competence originating in the psychology literature are
connected with laboratory decision-making in a financial setting. Therefore the design of the3
experiment is partly based on previous approaches used to calibrate competence levels as well
as measure overconfidence effects (Heath and Tversky, 1991). We then tested whether these
measures have a significant influence on individual investment behavior under different
formats of uncertainty that included pure risk and two levels of ambiguity.
The paper proceeds with a discussion of some of the relevant literature.  The topics of
ambiguity, the competence effect, overconfidence and gender related issues are briefly
covered. We then state the testable hypotheses and follow with a description of the
experimental design paying special attention to the key issues that arise in the statistical
analysis of the data. Our discussion of results follows the design section and finally, we close
with conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2. Relevant Literature
Ever since Ellsberg (1961) presented his famous paradox, researchers have been interested in
modeling and understanding the distinction between risk and ambiguity. Camerer and Weber
(1992) provide a review of empirical work and theoretical models of decisions under
ambiguity.
1 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) describe ambiguity effects as preferences that
differ with the source of uncertainty. Using the Tversky and Kahneman line of reasoning, in
order to understand individual attitudes towards ambiguity one has to understand source
preferences (what makes the individual prefer one source of uncertainty over another). Heath
and Tversky (1991) offered perceived competence as one explanation for source preferences.
According to their competence hypothesis, the willingness to accept ambiguity, depends on
more than the judged probability of future outcomes and the information available. It also
                                                
1Recent literature in the modelling of ambiguity focuses on rank dependent models. A good literature review on
that issue can be found in Diecidue and Wakker, (2001). For a list of annotated references on decisions and
uncertainty by P. Wakker see http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/wakker/refs/rfrncs.htm.4
depends on the individual’s assessment of his or her own ability to evaluate and process the
information accurately in the relevant decision context. The Heath and Tversky (1991)
measure of competence used bets on self-assessed accuracy of answers to knowledge-based
questions. Heath and Tversky (1991) concluded that subjects were ambiguity seeking (averse)
only in the contexts that they felt relatively more (less) knowledgeable and interpreted this
positive relationship as a competence effect. The reason for the existence of such a
competence effect may be that some individuals may attribute a bad (good) outcome of a
decision as bad (good) luck whereas others attribute it to their capabilities in general. The
attributions that different individuals would assign to the same outcome are referred to as
“credit and blame” attributions (Heath and Tversky, 1991). Using a more general self-
assessment of  knowledge than the Heath and Tversky (1991) competence measure, Keppe
and Weber (1995) achieved similar results for financial market decisions.
The aforementioned results provide evidence that ambiguity does not command a stable
premium in addition to the risk premium. The competence hypothesis provides an explanation
for the relationship between ambiguity and risk aversion. When individuals believe
themselves to be competent they favor an ambiguous lottery over a risky one. The evidence
for this over- or undervaluation seems to be caused by what the individual internally perceives
as his or her competence level in the respective field.
Fox and Tversky (1995) find that ambiguity aversion is stimulated in a comparative setting
and disappears in a noncomparative context.
2 Using the term “comparative ignorance”, they
propose that the individual will compare his or her limited knowledge in one context with
superior knowledge in another context. A second kind of comparison could be with other
                                                
2Chow and Sarin (2001) partly replicated these findings. However, the preference for risk persists in their study.
Fox and Weber (2002) replicated the result and extend it to the situation of familiar-unfamiliar situations.5
individuals that are perceived to be more knowledgeable. In both cases, comparative
ignorance influences behavior towards uncertainty and is strongly related to the competence
effect mentioned above. When individuals feel competent, they may act ambiguity seeking.
But in a comparative setting the feeling of competence may change, resulting in ambiguity
averse behavior such as the well known Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961).
The result that individuals are overconfident, i.e. overestimate their self-assessed knowledge,
is perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgement literature (DeBondt and
Thaler, 1995). Recently, the concept has received increasing attention in economic literature.
Overconfidence in financial decision-making has received much attention in analytical studies
(Odean,1999; Gervais and Odean, 2001, Daniel et. al., 1998) as well as empirical studies
(Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2002, Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).
3 These studies use
interpretations of overconfidence derived from the psychological literature (Laschke and
Weber, 1999). In the psychological literature, calibration studies are used to describe
overconfidence
4. In such studies subjects are asked to answer a question and to state how sure
they are about the correctness of their response by indicating a judged probability of
correctness. These probability judgements may be interpreted as confidence levels. They are
collected in categories and then compared with subjects’ accuracy, i.e. percentage of correct
answers. It turns out that most individuals are overconfident.  A visual representation of
overconfidence is identified when the corresponding points lay below the 45° line in a graph
that plots the confidence levels (judged probabilities) against the accuracy (see for example
Griffin and Tversky, 1992).
                                                
3 For a survey of research on overconfidence see Laschke and Weber (1999) (in German).
4 Calibration studies measure the absolute overrating of an individual’s knowledge. There are also studies which
measure the relative overrating such as Svennson (1981).6
Basically overconfidence is then the overrating of the individual’s own competence and thus
the feeling of competence controls the action (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). When it comes to
financial decisions, the question is what drives ambiguity seeking or ambiguity averse
behavior? Do overconfidence and competence measure the same effect or is overconfidence
independent of an individual’s objective knowledge?
There is evidence that women are less overconfident when the domain is more male oriented
(for example: Beyer and Bowden, 1997). Anecdotally, financial markets are populated by
more men than women (Merrill Lynch, 1996). In addition, women seem to be perceived as
more conservative investors and are offered less risky investments by brokers (Wang, 1994).
An experiment by Eckel and Grosmann (2001) also provides supporting evidence that women
are expected to be more risk averse by other women as well as by men. Therefore it may be
possible, that the competence effect may be influenced by gender. Field evidence seems to
support the conjecture that women and men approach financial decision-making differently.
In general, women have portfolios with a lower degree of risk than men (Jianakoplos and
Bernasek, 1996; Merrill Lynch, 1996). But if women perceive themselves as less
knowledgeable in financial markets, competence effects as well as (over)confidence effects
may play a role.
Taking these two effects together, gender specific portfolios with a varying degree of risk
might result.  Given the regularities in the field evidence (Jianakoplios and Bernasek, 1996,
Sunden and Surette, 1997, Barber and Odean, 2001), can we identify similar gender-linked
regularities in a laboratory financial decision context?
Eckel and Grossmann (2001) found significant gender differences in choices between several
risky prospects with women indicating a preference for the less risky prospect. Also when
asked about their attitudes towards financial risks, women seem to report a lower risk
propensity than men (Barsky et.al., 1997). On the other hand, although Schubert et.al. (1999)7
found gender differences in abstract gambling decisions, the differences disappeared with the
introduction of an investment decision context. Kruse and Thompson (2002) also found no
significant differences between men and women in low probability loss situations. For
choices under ambiguity, Powell and Ansic (1998) found that women are more uncertainty
averse than men irrespective of familiarity, framing or costs. In their experiment, individuals
demonstrate ambiguity averse behavior in unfamiliar situations when compared to familiar
ones. Schubert et al. (2000) found weak differences under two different formats of ambiguity
but again no differences under risk.
We conjecture that these sometimes contradictory results within risk experiments as well as
between risk and ambiguity experiments may be caused by second order characteristics that
influence the behavior of men and women differently. We investigate the influence of
individual characteristics on attitudes toward uncertainty including whether competence
and/or overconfidence have a second order effect on gender differences.
3. Hypotheses and Experimental Design
3.1. Hypotheses
Referring to the aforementioned competence and overconfidence effects as well as to the
discussion of gender differences, three main research hypotheses, each with an ancillary
hypothesis, are stated below:
H1: There is a competence effect for financial decision-making.
H1.1: There are gender differences with respect to the competence effect.
H2: There is an overconfidence effect for financial decision-making.
H2.1: There are gender differences with respect to the overconfidence effect.8
H3: The degree of ambiguity (none versus one-sided versus two-sided ambiguity) has a
measurable influence on certainty equivalents for financial options. Further, certainty
equivalents depend on competence and overconfidence effects.
H3.1: There are gender differences in the response to ambiguity. The relationship of
competence and overconfidence with stated certainty equivalents exhibit a gender
effect.
3.2. Experimental Design
This design was created to combine a standard method of calibration as described in the
previous sections with an experiment constructed to elicit the value of ambiguous and risky
lotteries.  As such, it can be viewed in two parts, Part A and Part B, described below.
Part A: Sections A1 and A2 form a replication of an experiment reported in Heath and
Tversky (1991). The complete instructions (in English) can be found in the appendix. In
section A1, subjects answered twenty questions that relate to knowledge of financial markets
and companies that are publicly traded. 16 out of 20 questions were true knowledge questions
whereas the remaining 4 out of 20 were guessing questions – all related to financial markets.
After choosing one of two answers as the correct one, subjects were instructed to state the
probability that they believed their answer to be correct. The judged probability could range
from 50% (purely a guess) to 100% (the correct answer with certainty). After collecting
subjects’ responses to the twenty questions, part A2 used the judged probabilities to construct
lotteries. For each question subjects were offered the choice between betting on the
correctness of their answer and betting on a lottery.  The probability of a win on the lottery
matched the subject’s judged probability that her answer was correct.  In both situations a win9
paid 40 CHF and a loss paid 0 CHF.
5  Heath and Tversky (1991) describe this as a choice
between a lottery with well-defined probabilities and an ambiguous lottery.
6 After completing
both parts A1 and A2, one of the questions was randomly selected and played out to
determine the subject’s earnings.  Subjects were given a receipt for their earnings plus a 10
CHF payment for showing up on time. They were instructed to bring their receipt to part B
the following week to receive payment for both sessions in cash at the conclusion of part B.
Part B: The structure of part B was quite different from part A. We elicited subjects’ certainty
equivalents for a set of twelve lotteries. Each of the twelve lotteries was presented as a bet on
a 0.5% daily increase in the market price of a fund.  Note that this structure is similar to an
option and restricts the uncertainty to a gain domain. Subjects were asked to choose between a
certain amount of money and a bet on a 0.5% increase in the fund price.
There are three forms of uncertainty characterized on twelve decision sheets in part B. We
asked for decisions on the outcome of four real funds, four virtual funds, and four funds with
well defined probabilities. This structure allowed us to compare decisions by individuals
facing two-sided ambiguity, one-sided ambiguity and pure risk. We controlled the
probabilities in the virtual and pure-risk funds so that individuals were facing similar
objective expectations. We will describe the funds more carefully below.
The first four decision sheets for real funds elicited certainty equivalents when there is two-
sided ambiguity. The ambiguity was two-sided in that neither the experimenter nor the subject
had precise knowledge of the underlying probability distribution. Decision sheets gave
information for a particular fund issued by the Bank Hofmann. Bank Hofmann is a small
                                                
540 CHF are approximate 26 USD.
6 An example of a knowledge question in part A1 and a decision sheet for part A2 can be found in the
instructions.10
Swiss bank specialized in the field of private banking. The funds were Swiss Stocks, Swiss
Small Stocks, Euro Stocks, and Swiss Rent (a bond fund). We provided historical price
information on the funds.  Subjects had a chart of the fund price over the past year, a chart of
price changes over the same period, and the price quotes for the ten trading days prior to the
experiment.  Hereafter, we will refer to this case of two-sided ambiguity as the real funds
information (RFI) uncertainty format.
[Insert Figure 1]
Figure 1 shows an example of the information we provided. The resolution of uncertainty
came with the fund price announcement at 3 pm just before the conclusion of the experiment.
Subjects were given a website where they could verify all prices later if they wished.
Our four virtual funds with one-sided ambiguity bear a close resemblance to the real funds.
We used each time series of real fund prices to create a virtual fund simulation. The mean and
variance estimates of the first difference in daily prices were used to create a simulated price
time series. Because the experimenter knew the underlying process that generated the time
series, the virtual funds represent one-sided ambiguity on decision sheets numbered five
through eight.  We will refer to one-sided ambiguity as the virtual fund information (VFI)
uncertainty format.  Subjects were told which sheets gave information on real funds and
which ones were virtual funds. The same stochastic process was used to draw forty
representatives of the next price in the virtual price series. Subjects knew that they would
draw one of these representatives to determine the daily price change and in so doing
determine the outcome of their bet.
After the first eight sheets were completed, the last four sheets were distributed. These sheets
gave both the subject and the experimenter the same information about the probability of the
price change. The probabilities were represented numerically in a table and visually in a pie11
chart on decision sheets nine through twelve.
7  This case is referred to as the pure risk
uncertainty format.
To summarize, the twelve lotteries represented four approximate expected values (14 CHF, 12
CHF, 10 CHF, and less than 5 CHF) in three uncertainty formats (two-sided ambiguity, one-
sided ambiguity, and pure risk). The structure of the twelve lotteries with frequencies or
probabilities is shown in Table 1 below.
[Insert table 1]
We concluded both parts of the experiment with a questionnaire. The questionnaire for part A
contained questions on age, sex, monthly income, experience with different types of financial
options, and self-assessed knowledge on financial markets. The questionnaire for part B asked
questions about house money effects, about the interpretation of a loss or gain from the
experiment, and asked for a self report of the decision process.
4. Data
Subjects from several different major fields of study were recruited for the experiment from
undergraduate courses at University of Zurich and Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.
None of them had prior experience with economics experiments. In part A of the experiment,
55 subjects participated. For the part B, 52 subjects returned (3 subjects did not). We
excluded 2 subjects from our analysis of the results, because we were unable to interpret their
responses to part B. Therefore we report the results of decisions by 50 individuals that
completed both part A and part B. The average payment per subject was CHF 82.50.
8
                                                
7 The example decision sheet from the instructions for a virtual fund as well as for a risky fund can be found in
the appendix.
8 82.50 CHF are approximate 53 USD.12
For the analysis of part A we used the first 15 pure knowledge questions. We excluded one of
the knowledge questions, because doubts arose if all subjects understood the question
properly.
9
Our hypothesis tests are based on statistical analysis of 750 data points in part A and 600 data
points in part B.
5. Results
Based on the aforementioned hypotheses, statistical analysis of the experimental data gives us
the following results:
H1: There is a competence effect for financial decision-making.
In order to investigate the first hypothesis in a quantitative way, we used a measure for
competence similar to the one proposed by Heath and Tversky (1991). We took a binary
correlation coefficient that - for each subject - related the judged probability of the correctness
of an answer to the choice of the ambiguous lottery.
10 We denote the binary correlation
coefficient for an individual by COMP. If COMP is positive, this may be interpreted as
evidence in support of the Competence Hypothesis. 82% of the subjects in our sample yielded
positive correlation coefficients. The average correlation coefficient was 0.48. A t-test
indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 1% level of
significance. We conclude that for the given financial knowledge questions, a significant
                                                
9 One third of all subjects stated in this question that they were 100% sure but were wrong whereas only 2
subjects with the same statement were right. The question asked if Switzerland or India has the higher GDP. We
suppose that many subjects confused GDP with GDP per capita, attributing the higher GDP to Switzerland.
10  The correlation coefficient was constructed in the following way.  For each individual, the choice of the
ambiguous or risky lottery was correlated with whether his/her judged probability was above or below the group
median for each question.13
overall competence effect was found. This replicates results from Heath and Tversky (1991)
for the financial market context.
H1.1: There are gender differences with respect to the competence effect.
The second part of our Hypothesis 1 addresses whether there are gender differences in the
competence effect.
[Insert Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the judged probability and the propensity to choose
the ambiguous bet for men and women. A t-test indicates no significant difference in the
proportion of women that choose the ambiguous lottery at each judged probability and the
corresponding proportion of men. An evaluation of Part A in isolation would lead us to
conclude that there are no significant differences in ambiguity aversion due to gender.
However, we do find significant differences in the variances for men and women.
11 In order
to explain gender differences in ambiguity seeking, other factors must be considered. We will
describe the interaction of gender with other factors when we discuss our results on tests of
hypotheses H3 and H3.1.
H2: There is an overconfidence effect for financial decision-making.
The second hypothesis deals with overconfidence. The calibration curve is a standard method
of representing overconfidence graphically. In order to construct such a calibration curve one
classifies all answers in Part A according to their judged probabilities. For each class of
judged probabilities, the proportion of correct answers(accuracy), is calculated. The accuracy
                                                
11This is according to Levene’s test for equality of variances. Additionally, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
differences in distributions does indicate there is a significant difference in the distribution of choices by males
and females at the 5% level of significance.14
is then represented as a function of the underlying judged probabilities. Overconfidence is
indicated if the data points lie below the 45
o line in a graph with the correctness proportion
(accuracy) on the vertical axis and the judged probabilities (confidence level) on the
horizontal axis. Figure 3 contains two calibration curves, one for subjects with total objective
knowledge scores above the median and one for subjects with a score below the median.
Hereafter, we will refer to individuals belonging to either partition as high knowledge or low
knowledge subjects.
[Insert Figure 3]
Examining this overconfidence effect in more detail we find that low knowledge people
demonstrate a higher degree of overconfidence than high knowledge persons. This aspect of
the high knowledge and low knowledge calibration curves is consistent with Heath and
Tversky (1991). This result is also in line with previous calibration studies (Griffin and
Tversky, 1992). In addition one sees that with increasing judged probabilities the proportion
correct is also increasing. Our data seems to suggest the existence of overconfidence. Yet, of
course, statistical significance cannot be determined using graphical analysis. Therefore, it is
appropriate to construct an adequate measure in order to quantify the overconfidence effect.
In order to use overconfidence in our regressions for hypothesis H3, we need a measure that
captures individual differences. Since the measure used for the graphical determination of
overconfidence is not an individualized measure, a further indicator is needed. We calculate
for each individual, the difference between the average judged probability of correctness and
the average correctness proportion (over fifteen questions). Let us denote this overconfidence15
measure by OC.
12 On the basis of this indicator, a t-test on our experimental data from Part A
shows that there is a statistically significant overall overconfidence effect.
H2.1: There are gender differences with respect to the overconfidence effect.
To test for gender differences in the overconfidence measure, we use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for differences in distributions.  For both high and low knowledge groups, we find that
men are significantly more confident than women.  In the low knowledge group, men are
more over-confident.  In the high knowledge group, men are fairly accurate in their self
knowledge.  High knowledge women, on the other hand are under-confident.  In other words,
high knowledge women state subjective probabilities that are below their knowledge-based
accuracy.
H3: The degree of ambiguity has a measurable influence on certainty equivalents for
financial options. Further, certainty equivalents depend on competence and overconfidence
effects.
H3.1: There are gender differences in the response to ambiguity. The relationship of
competence and overconfidence with stated certainty equivalents exhibit a gender
effect.
We used regression analysis in order to evaluate the transmission of competence and
overconfidence to choice behavior in a financial context. We used the stated certainty
equivalents (CEs) as the dependent variable with explanatory variables representing
approximate expected value, measures of ambiguity, competence, overconfidence, objective
                                                
12 In a similar way, one could have looked at the difference between the average correctness of answers
(expressed in septiles) and the self-assessed knowledge according to the questionnaire from part A (expressed on
a seven-digit scale). Due to the high correlation of 72% between judged probabilities and self-assessed
knowledge there is a high correlation between the two overconfidence indicators. We have chosen OC to stay as
close as possible to the concept of calibration.16
knowledge and gender. Since the regressions integrate gender specific variables, it is
reasonable to treat hypothesis H3 and H3.1 simultaneously.
[Insert Table 2]
Table 2 contains a description of the explanatory variables. In the following, these variables
and their explanatory power are examined in detail. Recall that we present uncertainty in three
formats. The first format used lotteries based on real funds information (RFI) and thus two-
sided ambiguity.  The second format used lotteries based on virtual funds information (VFI)
with statistical properties similar to the real funds and represented one-sided ambiguity.  The
third format used pure risk lotteries.
13 Variables L1, L2, L3, and L4 denote lotteries grouped
by approximate expected values. The lottery with the smallest approximate expected value
(L3) served as the base case variable. Competence and overconfidence are represented by the
measures COMP and OC that were constructed to test hypotheses H1 and H2. We also used a
measure of objective knowledge, denoted by the variable KNOW, which indicates the
absolute number of correct answers given by an individual.
14
[Insert Table 3]
Table 3 summarizes the results of the regressions. Regression 1 includes knowledge,
competence and overconfidence measures as well as gender, primary interaction terms and
                                                
13 Both subject and experimenter had the same information and access to the random number generating process.
14A t-test does indicate a slight but significant difference in the number of correct answers between men and
women (significance level 5%). On average males in our sample demonstrated more “objective knowledge” on
financial markets than females.17
secondary interaction terms. Due to repeated measures, we estimated a random effects model
using generalized least squares.
15
Our regression results indicate, first, that individuals were sensitive to the estimated expected
values  of the lotteries (L1, L2, L3, L4) regardless of the uncertainty format (RFI, VFI, Pure
Risk). This is seen in the highly significant coefficients on the lottery variables all in the
correct direction and of a magnitude consistent with differences in expected value. This effect
was robust, producing highly significant coefficients to all specifications of the model we
tested.
Secondly, we find that the real funds evoke a stronger response than the virtual funds.
Ambiguity aversion leads to a significantly lower certainty equivalent in general for the real
funds compared to the pure risk base case. With one-sided ambiguity although there are no
significant direct effects, there are secondary effects that can be explained by overconfidence,
competence and knowledge.
The effect of overconfidence - as measured in Part A of the experiment - on the certainty
equivalents in Part B varies according to the uncertainty formats and to gender. For females,
as expected, overconfidence manifests as a significant increase in risk seeking and ambiguity
seeking behavior
16. With one-sided ambiguity (VFI), the magnitude of the overconfidence
effect is between that of the two other formats. We find that the influence of overconfidence is
                                                
15 A Breusch Pagan Test  favored a random effects model over the classical regression model at significance
level less than 1%. The fixed effects model was collinear due to a separate constant for each individual in
addition to the other variables.  We also tested for several experimental effects, such as house money, gambling
effect or isolation effect, with data from the questionnaire. None of these effects were significant.
16 Rabin (1997) reports, that when the questions become more vague, overconfidence of high knowledge
individuals increases disproportionally. However, we did not find that such an effect has an additional influence18
strongest in the two sided ambiguity case.  In contrast to females, male overconfidence leads
to lower CEs  in the pure risk case. The effect of overconfidence on CE’s for one-sided
ambiguity (VFI) is also negative whereas only in the two-sided ambiguity (RFI) case, higher
overconfidence leads to higher CEs as expected. It seems that for males the existence of a
probability distribution, known or unknown, dampens the propensity to seek risk or
ambiguity.
The competence measure has no significant general effect. However, there is a significant
effect when competence is allowed to interact with the ambiguous lottery formats.
Competence tends to dampen the overconfidence effect for men in the two sided ambiguity
(RFI) case. On the other hand, competence and overconfidence reinforce ambiguity seeking
behavior in women facing the real fund (RFI) case.
The knowledge variable gives us some interesting results.  For males, higher knowledge goes
with less risk and ambiguity seeking. There is a smaller effect in the real fund case than in the
virtual fund case. For females, however, higher knowledge leads to higher certainty
equivalents, i.e. more risk and ambiguity seeking behavior. The variable, KNOW is an
objective measure of a subject’s knowledge and produces an opposite effect for men and
women.
Due to the elicitation of CEs for different types of uncertainty within one experiment,
“comparative ignorance” could become an important factor (Fox and Tversky, 1995). In our
experiment different types of comparisons are possible. Virtual funds yield comparisons
between the experimenter and the less informed participants. Additionally, there are
comparisons between the information in the three formats of uncertainty (RFI, VFI and pure
                                                                                                                                                        
on CE’s. A detailed analysis of our results with respect to this evidence is available from the authors upon
request.19
risk) all within one experiment. One may presume that the sequencing of the different
decision sheets matters with respect to the comparisons individuals make. Individuals
evaluated first, the four real funds, thereafter four virtual funds and finally four risky funds. It
seems plausible that individuals compared the funds as they followed each other. This means
that the assessment of virtual funds will be influenced by the corresponding assessment of real
funds and the assessment of risky funds will depend on the corresponding assessment of
virtual funds. According to Fox and Tversky (1995) comparative ignorance should be
measured by competence (COMP) and knowledge (KNOW). The comparison between
different uncertainty formats should be captured by the interaction terms of COMP and
KNOW with RFI and VFI as well as with FEMALE.
17
When comparing risky funds to virtual funds, individuals seem to perceive them as similar. It
turns out that only the coefficient of CompV (competence x virtual fund) is significant. Hence
the comparison with the virtual fund lotteries seem to influence the certainty equivalents
observed for pure risk lotteries. However, in spite of the significance, the average effect on
the certainty equivalent is relatively small which implies low perceived differences between
virtual funds and pure risk lotteries. In both cases the experimenter has knowledge about the
distribution of future prices. For risky funds, the subjects have the same knowledge, whereas
they lack the corresponding knowledge for the virtual funds. It seems that in the case of
virtual funds subjects think themselves to be able to assess the relevant price distribution.
These effects hold for men and women equally.
                                                
17 Chow and Sarin (2001) explain “comparative ignorance” by an additional factor, the so-called “Evaluability
Hypothesis” (Hsee et.al., 1999). This hypothesis says that ignorance is an implicit attribute of uncertain options,
which is easier to evaluate in a comparative context. This effect should not be a problem in our experiment,
because in the context of evaluabilty,  we ordered the different uncertainty formats from difficult to easy.20
When comparing virtual to real funds, quite different results are obtained. As the effect of real
on virtual funds is the focus here, both interactions of COMP and KNOW with RFI and VFI
are important when significant. For males the effect of COMPR (competence x real fund) is
reinforced by COMPV (competence x virtual fund). Additionally the coefficient on KNOWR
(knowledge x real fund) is significant. Taken together this indicates a rather large effect. For
females there is an additional effect of FCOMPR (female x competence x real fund) such that
the influence of comparative ignorance is even stronger.  Both effects described above are in
line with the predictions of Fox and Tversky (1995). We conclude that when evaluating
different formats within the same experiment, comparative ignorance is important. However
comparative ignorance does not explain all of the differences in behavior between risky and
ambiguous lotteries--some of the differences are explained, in part, by overconfidence.
Lastly, to gain a better understanding of the importance of the interaction of gender with
competence and overconfidence, we examined a specification that stripped out the interaction
terms.  This specification (regression 2 in table 2) with explanatory variables L1, L2, L4,
RFI,VFI and a dummy variable FEMALE yields the observation that FEMALE is not
significant. This is in marked contrast to regression 1 of table 2 with a totality of all gender
effects significant at the 1%-level.
18 One may presume that the existence of positive and
negative gender effects on CEs confound an overall gender effect in a regression that does not
control for individual heterogeneity measured by competence and overconfidence.
[Table 4]
Table 4 collects and summarizes the direct and secondary effects on observed certainty
equivalents. The gender specific constant for females is highly significant and negative
                                                
18 The joint significance of the gender variables has been tested with a Wald test.21
whereas other gender effects, calculated out of the interactions, increase the certainty
equivalent. On the other hand, the constant, which represents the general effect for males in
the lowest probability risky fund, is highly positive. Most of the male effects decrease the
certainty equivalent from this point on. In Table 5 we report forecasted CEs for low and high
knowledge males and females out of the regression. Note that the highest certainty
equivalents are forecasted for low knowledge males whereas the lowest certainty equivalents
are forecasted for low knowledge females. When we look additionally at the effect of the
knowledge variable and its interaction with FEMALE one sees the high impact of these
variables that work in different directions for men and women. It seems that the women
evaluate the lotteries from “below” and respond with a higher certainty equivalent as
knowledge increases. This result is consistent with the competence hypothesis suggested by
Heath and Tversky (1991). On the other hand it seems that males evaluate certainty
equivalents from “above” and become more cautioned with increasing knowledge which is in
accordance with the regression hypothesis of Einhorn and Hogarth (1986). Moreover the
effect of knowledge dominates both the overconfidence and the competence effects.
[Table 5]
6. Conclusions
This experiment was designed to identify the relationship between attitudes toward
uncertainty and individual measures of overconfidence and competence in a financial decision
context. We found that two variables are of special importance for the explanation of the
willingness to pay for ambiguous or risky lotteries: overconfidence and objective knowledge.
In addition, our results show that gender plays an important role in predicting choices when
individuals are confronted with uncertainty.22
The influence of overconfidence varies with different uncertainty formats.  With respect to
gender, the willingness to pay for lotteries in the form of elicited certainty equivalents is
lower for women than for men in general. However, overconfidence and knowledge reduce
the corresponding difference. The influence of overconfidence on the willingness to pay
varies significantly between men and women. Controlling for comparative ignorance, subjects
generally demonstrate ambiguity aversion when confronted with two-sided ambiguity. Given
the importance of knowledge in the context of comparative ignorance, our results imply that
comparisons have an effect on certainty equivalents elicited in both the pure risk and
ambiguity cases.
For all uncertainty formats, with increasing objectively measured knowledge men become
more risk or ambiguity averse whereas women become more risk or ambiguity prone. As a
consequence, among low knowledge individuals, men are more risk or ambiguity prone.
Among high knowledge individuals, women are more risk or ambiguity prone.
Our results imply that individual characteristics, like knowledge and overconfidence, may
have effects that are idiosyncratic to group membership or social affiliation.  Our study
examines the interaction of individual characteristics with gender. Other affiliations such as
religion, race, or culture could produce similar results.  Studies that do not take into account
the interaction of individual characteristics with group identities may produce misleading
results.
Our results indicate that an increase in knowledge in a financial decision making context can
create a near role reversal between men and women in attitudes toward uncertainty.  It seems
that the acquisition and rating of an individual’s contextual knowledge may help explain some
of the puzzles pertaining to gender differences in labor market and financial market outcomes.
If the knowledge acquisition is a “learning-by-doing” process, low knowledge men will
acquire the knowledge—sometimes by “hard knocks”, whereas women will not learn the23
same lessons from their more conservative approach. As a consequence, they will sustain risk
or ambiguity averse behavior.
Yet, the way in which increased knowledge changes men’s and women’s attitudes toward
uncertainty is not completely clear. Therefore, further research should concentrate on reasons
why knowledge and overconfidence are important predictors for choice behavior and on the
links between knowledge and overconfidence. It would be particularly interesting to conduct
further experiments which are able to track down “credit and blame” effects. The hypothesis
that credit and blame personality attributes have a gender effect could be consistent with our
empirical result. This hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that credit and blame attributions interact
with other group affiliations is fertile ground for future research.24
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